Nicknamed “the tank” because of his bear-like stature, Aleksei Mordashov is estimated to be worth £4.5bn. He is Russia’s seventh-richest man according to Forbes and a traditional oligarch in so far as he is a steel magnate. He owns a large stake in steel giant Severstal, which was privatised in 1993. Like so many of the oligarchs, the 40-year-old Mordashov was in the right place at the right time. He was finance director of the Cherepovets steel mill north of Moscow and was asked by the elderly general director to buy up the company’s shares to prevent them falling into the hands of an outsider. Mordashov snapped up a lot of the shares on the cheap for himself. In 1996 he became the firm’s general director and later turned it into a powerful conglomerate, buying a car-maker, coal mines, railway companies and port facilities. Unusually for an oligarch, he has lamented the huge gulf between Russia’s rich and poor. Married with three children, he is regarded as a Kremlin loyalist and as a staunch Vladimir Putin supporter.
Posts Tagged ‘Vladimir Putin’
M IS FOR MORDASHOV
Saturday, May 5th, 2012K IS FOR KHODORKOVSKY
Saturday, May 5th, 2012Once Russia’s richest man and its most powerful oligarch, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, 42, is now the country’s most famous inmate. He was jailed for fraud and tax evasion last year. His supporters contend that he was imprisoned because of his growing interest in politics, and his opposition to President Putin. The Kremlin claims that he was a latter-day Al Capone who was involved in organised crime who had to be stopped.
When Forbes published its first Russian rich list in 2004, Khodorkovsky headed it with an estimated £8bn fortune, ahead of Roman Abramovich. That figure is now estimated to have dwindled to several hundred million pounds, and he does not feature on this year’s rich list since he has been all but stripped of his assets.
Married (second time round) with four children, the original source of his wealth was oil, via the Yukos company that he built up during the 1990s. He is serving his eight-year prison sentence 3,100 miles east of Moscow in the remote Siberian penal colony of Yag 14/10, where his current existence bears little resemblance to the life he knew outside of prison. Khodorkovsky was recently attacked by a fellow inmate with a cobbler’s knife.
Dozens of Russian opposition activists detained
Sunday, April 1st, 2012More than 70 Russian opposition activists, including writer Eduard Limonov, were on Saturday arrested during unauthorised gatherings in Moscow and St Petersburg.
In Moscow, around 300 people, some shouting “Russia withoutPutin” gathered in Triumfalnaya Square.
Police called on the activists to disperse, pushing them towards adjacent streets, and arrested around 60 people, agency Ria Novosti said quoting police.
A police officer suffered burns to the face as a result of a smoke bomb allegedly thrown by a demonstrator, police added.
The rally was part of the opposition’s long-running campaign to uphold Article 31 of the constitution which guarantees freedom of assembly.
Limonov, leader of a nationalist left-wing opposition group, was also arrested and taken to a police vehicle, Interfax said.
In Saint Petersburg, about 60 people tried to stage a demonstration but were dispersed by police who detained 15 people, according to police.
Earlier in Moscow’s Pushkin Square around 100 people gathered for a “meeting” organised by far-left activist Sergei Udaltsov of the Left Front movement.
But when two activists tried to unfurl a banner, they were arrested, the Ria Novosti agency said. Another was detained after allegedly attacking pro-Kremlin activists who had come to recite Russian poetry.
The Interfax agency said activists hostile to the opposition supporters had assembled to “pray” near the gathering.
Vladimir Putin, having just served as prime minister, was elected for a third presidential term in a March 4 election with over 63 percent of votes despite months of protests against his regime.
Down but far from out
Wednesday, March 7th, 2012“MOSCOW Does Not Believe in Tears.” The title of a popular Soviet-era melodrama became the slogan of last night’s protest rally, held near the Pushkin monument in the heart of the Russian capital.
A day earlier Vladimir Putin had shed a tear when he addressed a 100,000-strong crowd of grim-looking supporters, many of whom had been coerced or paid to join the throng. Muscovites, most of whom voted against Mr Putin in Sunday’s presidential election, were repelled by this staged crowd scene and the heavy military presence that accompanied it in their city.
Yesterday evening some 15,000 of them gathered on Pushkin Square, in bitterly cold conditions, to protest against an election they considered to be dishonest. The atmosphere was tense. On the way to the demonstration I counted 20 lorries filled with soldiers. Many more were parked behind the square.
The riot police that surrounded the square seemed all the more intimidating next to the mostly open and friendly faces of the protesters. Unlike the ready-made banners at Sunday’s pro-Putin rally, most of the ones at the Pushkin square were handwritten. One young woman held aloft a sign urging: “Putin, don’t cry”.
Yet yesterday’s rally felt very different from the protests that have taken place in Moscow since December’s rigged parliamentary election. Some of those had pulled in as many as 70,000 middle-class Muscovites, but it wasn’t just the numbers that were down last night. So was the mood of the protesters. “I did not really feel like coming here tonight, but I came because I felt I had to,” one woman said.
Mr Putin’s victory on Sunday, with an official tally of 64% of the vote, made many protesters depressed. Although this result was also rigged, it is likely that the majority of the country voted for him. Previous protests had been not just upbeat, but almost euphoric. The atmosphere last night, by contrast, was one of hopelessness and frustration.
The protest movement seemed to have divided into those who did not feel comfortable with its growing radicalisation, and those for whom it was not radical enough. Some of the more successful middle-class Muscovites who had attended earlier protests out of a sense of indignation did not turn up.
Many of them had backed Mikhail Prokhorov, a liberal business tycoon who took 20% of the vote in Moscow on Sunday. Mr Prokhorov made a brief appearance at the rally. “I greet you, the free citizens of Russia,” he said. “I thank those who gave me their votes, despite the fact that the election was dishonest. I am in your debt.” His speech was well received.
Yet the biggest cheers went to Alexei Navalny, a popular blogger and politician who tried to mobilise his supporters with fiery rhetoric. “We are the real masters here!” he said. “We will occupy the streets and squares and we will not leave.”
But a day earlier Mr Navalny had told me that Mr Putin’s victory did not leave people feeling the same sense of indignation as the December elections had done, and that sustaining the intensity of the protest would not be easy. It required an escalation—but a measured one so that the sort of violence that would demoralise the movement could be avoided. This, in fact, is what Mr Navalny achieved yesterday.
When the sanctioned part of the protest was over, he and some other opposition politicians, including Sergei Udaltsov, a young radical communist, stayed put, taking a defensive position inside a snow-covered fountain. Their supporters stood around, watching hundreds of helmeted policemen prepare to move in.
A few minutes later the square turned into a whirl of bodies: the policemen tried to squeeze protesters out and to isolate those inside the fountain. The press, standing on a makeshift stage, watched the arrest of Mr Navalny and a few others. Then the police kicked them out too.
Unable to return to the square, hundreds of protesters walked out on to the busy Tverskaya Street and marched away from the Kremlin, shouting “Russia without Putin”. Sirens blasted and police vans broke up the crowd. Some 250 people were taken into custody.
Mr Putin did not opt to follow the example of neighbouring Belarus, where after a presidential election in December 2010 the security services first provoked violence and then beat everyone up. But nor was he content to allow protesters to move freely around the city. (While the attention of the police was firmly focused on peaceful protesters, a small group of ultra-nationalists were allowed to walk almost unhindered, attacking journalists and passers-by.)
Yet neither the anger at the heavy-handed police actions nor the excitement of Mr Navalny’s arrest (he and most others were released a few hours after being picked up) could disguise the falling intensity of the urban protest movement.
This does not mean that the changes in Russia that were set in motion in December will stop. But the course they follow will be longer, and less linear. The ideologists of the protest movement believe it needs not just a change of format, but a change of focus. The next few months may see a shift of protests to a more local level, zooming in on Moscow as a city rather than a federal capital.
“We must start the movement for bringing back the city in which we live,” a new manifesto said. Such an approach could mobilise the large number of Muscovites who are unhappy with the running of their city and want the freedom to choose their own mayor, something they currently lack. Ultimately, this could lead to far more tangible and consequential results than any of the previous protests.
Russia’s Protest Movement Finds Its Voice
Saturday, March 3rd, 2012
When Russian activists applied for a permit to stage a rally in Moscow the day after parliamentary elections on December 4 they expected about 500 people to attend. Widespread allegations of electoral fraud and a growing sense of disillusionment with the ruling party and Vladimir Putin, however, inspired more than 5,000 people to take to the streets. “It was as much a surprise for the organizers of that particular rally as it was for the Kremlin,” says Tanya Lokshina, Deputy Director of Human Rights Watch in Moscow. Five days later more than 50,000 Muscovites took part in a second rally. Even larger protests were held on December 24 and February 4. Last Sunday, in what was perhaps the most ambitious action yet, some 35,000 protesters formed a human chain along Moscow’s ten-mile Garden Ring Road, which encircles the city center. Many of the participants brought their children as well as candy, tea and cigarettes to share, white carnations and balloons, and even their white pets—cats and dogs—white being the symbol of peaceful protest.
“I would say that right now, this week in particular, the mood in Moscow is rather festive,” says Lokshina. “People are celebrating. What they’re celebrating, in part, is that for the last three months the momentum was never lost. People did not get tired. People did not go back to passivity. People did not go back to the privacy of their own kitchen. They’re still ready to take to the streets. They’re still ready to make their voices heard.”
Which is part of the paradox of Sunday’s presidential elections. Though many are demanding fundamental changes to the political process—free and fair elections, fewer obstacles to registering political parties, and the direct election of regional governors, to name just a few—when voters go to the polls they will be reminded of just how carefully managed Russia’s democracy is. Other than Putin himself the usual suspects—Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov, Liberal Democratic Party showman Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Sergei Mironov of the loyal Just Russia Party—are all running in what has become a kind of photo op for the Kremlin (the list of candidates looks pretty much like it has for every electoral cycle since 2000). The only outlier is billionaire oligarch Mikhail Prokhorov who has exhibited an independent streak in recent months but is better known for his close ties to the Kremlin.
There is little doubt that Putin will win. But it may come at great cost. Whether he wins in the first or second round his authority has already been greatly diminished (The head of Russia’s Levada Center, a widely respected independent polling agency, recently described Putin as a “weak authoritarian leader”). In addition, as Timothy Frye of Columbia University’s Harriman Institute points out, “The two things that have helped him—high growth rates and high approval ratings—are not coming back. He can try to distance himself from United Russia and he can try to criticize the state corporations but of course these are all products of his tenure. And United Russia has, I think, been quite discredited by the parliamentary elections. So Putin will be governing in an environment that is unfamiliar to him.”
He now faces a much different country than the one he has ruled virtually unchallenged for the last twelve years. Indeed after just three months of sustained protest the conversation in Moscow has shifted from one of how long Putin will reign—he could conceivably stay in office until 2024—to how long he’ll be able to hold on to power.
“It used to be the case that Putin would be there forever and ever—nobody ever talked about any alternatives,” says Andrew Wilson author of Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World. “Everybody’s talking about alternatives now. That taboo is broken.”
But that doesn’t make the opposition’s task any easier. In an e-mail, Ilya Faybisovich, one of the young organizers of the December protests, said that the post election strategy remains somewhat vague. Some of the more prominent leaders have called for the formation of a “mega-party” capable of incorporating the diverse interests of the opposition movement, from nationalists and liberal democrats, to communists and the so called non-political, under a single umbrella—one that could challenge United Russia and field its own candidate in a future presidential election. But this is not without its own risks. According to Lokshina such a party could play into the hands of the Kremlin, especially if the various factions are unable to maintain a unified front.
“I think that the most important thing to understand about this protest movement in Russia today,” says Lokshina, “is that this is about a bunch of very different people: People with different political views, people with no political agenda. It is not surprising therefore that one of the main slogans of the protest is, ‘I’m not opposition I’m just a citizen of my country.’”
“In order for the protest movement to continue making a difference it’s especially important to keep that unity for the sake of the same objective—the objective of making Russia a more democratic state.”
Despite the fact that Putin is expected to win here on Sunday, the election will play an important role in shaping the opposition as it moves into an uncertain future. In a way it already has. Since parliamentary elections in December tens of thousands of Russian citizens have registered to serve as election monitors, an unprecedented outpouring of civic engagement. (Alexey Navalny, the popular anti-corruption blogger launched a web site to recruit presidential election monitors, RosVybory, that already has more than 16,000 registrants.) Their efforts will also make it far more difficult for the Putin administration to claim that foreign interests and non-Russian NGOs are fabricating allegations of vote fraud. “When it’s genuine local Russians it’s much harder to dismiss their criticism,” says Wilson. Putin himself has promised to install web cameras in each of the country’s 91,000 polling stations. But this will do little to stop local and regional officials from simply fudging vote totals, what may have been the most widespread form of vote fraud in December. This could set off a new wave of protests.
But, as Wilson points out, “Whether there’s more or less fraud isn’t really the question. People are in the mood to protest anyway (after weeks of wrangling with Moscow’s City Hall the opposition recently secured a permit to hold a rally for up to 30,000 on March 5, the day after elections). Then what next? Putin could crackdown. The opposition could lose momentum. They could try and get a jump on him by using different tactics. Some people are talking about occupying public space like the Ukrainians did in 2004. So the next question is, can they move it up a notch?”
And if they do move it up a notch, whether by occupying public space or continuing the kinds of successful street protests of the last few months, the big question is how the Putin regime, once reinstalled in the Kremlin, will respond.
The honest answer is no one knows. It is hard to imagine the Putin administration putting up with any kind of occupation of public space for very long. The Kremlin, rather flat footed at first in its response to the protesters, has sent somewhat mixed signals in recent weeks. On the one hand they’ve allowed the massive protests to continue and though the police presence has been heavy they have clearly taken a soft approach (much credit is due to the non-violent tactics of the protesters themselves). On the other hand there are signs that this openness may be coming to an end. Several media outlets critical of the Kremlin have come under fire; slander campaigns against opposition figures have escalated; and activists have been subjected to the usual drumbeat of threatening phone calls, intimidation, and harassment.
“The climate for civil society remains very hostile,” says Lokshina. “It seems now that the Kremlin has bolstered its efforts aimed at harassment and discrediting the opposition be it political or civil opposition.”
The movement’s very strength and its ability to withstand the mounting pressure of the state may lie in its multiplicity of voices—the fact that it cannot be pigeonholed into standing for a single idea or behind a single leader. Yaroslav Nikitenko, an environmental activist who has been involved in the campaign to save an old-growth forest outside of Moscow as well as recent protests, wrote in an e-mail that a lot of the people attending the demonstrations are not there because they support some sort of abstract “movement.” “The basis of the protest is not for something,” he wrote, “but against the current totally corrupt and illegitimate system.” This explains in part the movement’s broad based appeal as well as the focus on free and fair elections (it operates under the banner, “For Honest Elections”) and opening up of the political process.
Beyond the push for a level electoral playing field, however, the coalition’s demands and vision are far from unified. Large questions loom chief among them the role of far-right nationalist groups in any sort of reform movement. Alexey Navalny, one of the group’s more prominent leaders whose fight against corruption has earned him a wide following, has openly embraced anti-immigrant nationalist rhetoric (a position he has held throughout his political career). Though he claims to believe in a kind of benign nationalism many on the left are uneasy about where this might lead. “It is a difficulty for many intellectuals and liberals—these sort of independent democrats who support him as an anti-corruption figure but do not support him as a nationalist,” says Maxim Trudolubov, opinion page editor of the business daily Vedomosti. In addition, though corruption has been an easy target to organize against, the protesters haven’t really put forward an economic vision that challenges the neoliberal orthodoxy of the Yeltsin and Putin years.
One exception is the Left Front, whose de facto leader, Sergei Udaltsov, has emerged as an outspoken organizer of the recent protests. Udaltsov secured the permit for the December 5 demonstration and has called for more radical measures—including unsanctioned rallies—if the administration doesn’t meet the protesters’ demands. Though focusing more recently on political and electoral reform Left Front has also pushed for the inclusion of economic and social justice—nationalization of strategic industries and a tax overhaul—in any sort of reform effort. It isn’t clear whether Left Front’s endorsement of Communist Party candidate Zyuganov in Sunday’s election is a temporary alliance or a long-term political strategy. Perhaps it reflects more the fluidity and openness of Russia’s rapidly changing political landscape.
Not unlike the Occupy movement here in the United States the nature of the protests as well as the messy and often fractious debates among members of the informal organizing committee (Orgkomitet), seem to be giving birth to new possibilities. For now the mood is one of cautious optimism even in the face of at least another six-year term for Vladimir Putin.
“It’s really about showing the Kremlin that there is a protest potential in the country,” says Lokshina, “that there is a vibrant civil society that can make a difference and that has to be taken into account.” Whether the Kremlin chooses to listen and make good on the promises of reform it has outlined thus far will come into focus after Sunday’s vote.
Russia tackles safety of kids on the Internet
Monday, February 13th, 2012I’m writing from Moscow, where I spoke at Russia’s Safer Internet Day conference last week. Safer Internet Day, which originated in Europe, is celebrated in much of the world, though there are relatively few events in the United States.
While most recent American Internet safety conferences focus on digital citizenship issues such as preventing cyberbullying, most speakers at the Russian event talked about protecting children from undesirable content. There was, however, one panel on digital literacy where my ConnectSafely.org co-director Anne Collier talked about strategies for helping kids learn to treat each other respectfully and to protect their online reputations.
Russia is behind the United States and much of Europe in Internet usage, but it’s growing quickly. In 2009, the World Bank reported Internet penetration in the Russian Federation at 42 percent but the growth curve is impressive. In 2006, it was only 18 percent. One speaker at the conference said it’s now over 50 percent, with even higher usage among youth.
Still, the Internet is new to many people in this former Soviet capitol and it’s common to be afraid of things that are unfamiliar. So my main role as a speaker was to try to put some of the safety concerns into perspective.
I reminded delegates that there was a time when people bought short-term life insurance before they got on an airplane. Those passengers
were probably less worried about their car crashing on the way to the airport, even though then, as now, driving was more dangerous than flying.
It’s a bit like that with technology. Bullying, pornography and child molestation have been around forever. But because widespread Internet use is new here, I heard politicians and others worrying aloud about the increased danger of the Net, even though American and European data show that most risks to kids are actually lower online than in the “real world,” and that sexual crimes against children have actually decreased by 58 percent between 1992 and 2008, the very years that huge numbers of U.S. kids got online. I’m not saying the Internet is the reason for the decline, but it certainly didn’t usher in any increase, as some feared it would.
One reason it’s important to put the fears into perspective is because there are lots of people in Russia, and in the United States as well, who want to put limits on Internet content in the name of protecting children. In fact, there is a law on the books in Russia that’s supposed to take effect in September that would require websites to classify themselves by age ratings so Internet service providers could block kids from content that would harm their “health and development.”
It’s not clear even to Internet professionals I spoke with here how this law is supposed to be implemented and whether it will apply just to Russian-based sites, or if ISPs will be required to filter out access to international sites that aren’t rated. One of the criteria bans kids’ access to images of sexual relations between people of the opposite sex. Apparently, the drafters forgot to include images of people of the same sex.
There were also people at the conference proposing that ISPs should be required to block access to certain types of illegal content. If this sounds familiar, think back just a couple of weeks ago to our debate around a pair of U.S. bills that would have done just that for sites with alleged pirated content.
Illegal content would, of course, include child pornography, even though images of children being abused already are illegal in Russia. But it could also include sites that advocate the use of drugs or alcohol, gambling sites and sites that advocate “extremism.” That last category is particularly bothersome to one political activist I spoke with who worries it could be used to block sites that advocate demonstrations against Prime Minister Vladimir Putin or some future regime.
Other countries do ban some extremist content. France and Germany, have laws that prohibit the display of Nazi memorabilia or advocacy of anti-Semitism. Depicting a swastika on an American website may be offensive to most of us, but it’s not illegal.
As I listened to simultaneous translation of the debates, I was reminded of the battles we’ve had in the United States over the past 15 years or so. In 1996, Congress passed the Communications Decency Act, which would have made it a crime for anyone to post content that kids could access that was “patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards.”
That was mostly overturned by the Supreme Court, and a somewhat less restrictive follow-up attempt, the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, was overturned by a federal circuit court. The Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal, which effectively killed that bill as well. We do have a law, the Children’s Internet Protection Act, that requires schools and libraries that receive certain federal funding to use filters and other measures to protect children from inappropriate content. But that doesn’t prevent the posting of the content and only applies to federally subsidized schools and libraries.
Russia’s White Revolution
Friday, February 10th, 2012Russia’s electoral scene has been transformed in the past two months, without a doubt inspired by the political winds from the Middle East and the earlier colour revolutions in Russia’s “near abroad”. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s casual return to the presidential scene was greeted as an effrontery by an electorate who want to move on from Russia’s political strongman tradition, and to inject the electoral process with ballot-box accountability.
Putin’s legendary role in rescuing Russia from the economic abyss in the 1990s, staring down the oligarchs, reasserting state control over Russian resource wealth, and repositioning Russia as an independent player in Eurasia (not to mention in America’s backyard) — these signal accomplishments assure him a place in history books. He and Dmitri Medvedev are considered the most popular leaders in the past century according to a recent VTsIOM opinion poll (Leonid Brezhnev comes next, followed by Joseph Stalin and Vladimir Lenin, with Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yelstin the least popular). He will very likely pass the 50 per cent mark in presidential elections 4 March, despite all the protests during the past two months calling for “Russia without Putin”. So why is he back in the ring?
It appears he was caught by surprise when the anti-Putin campaign exploded in November, fuelled by his decision to run again and the exposure of not a little fraud in the parliamentary elections in December. For the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the opposition was able to unite and stage impressive rallies, one after another. Despite the chilling Russian winter, they keep coming — this week saw four gathering around Moscow, totalling 130,000.
The opposition poster children even include Putin’s minister of finance Alexei Kudrin. Presidential hopefuls are Communist leader Gennadi Zyuganov (backed for the first time by the independent left forces), nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, A Just Russia’s Sergei Mironov and the oligarch playboy Mikhail Prokhorov — none of whom stand a chance of defeating Putin. This time there are 25 televised debates which began 6 February among the contenders, who are sparring with each other and “Putin’s representative”.
Is this quixotic march back to the Kremlin heights a case of egomania? Or is it a noble attempt to both cast in stone Russia as the Eurasian counterweight to an increasingly aggressive US/NATO, and shaking up the domestic political scene to make sure it will not slump into apathy when he himself passes the torch? And if things go wrong, is this Russia’s very own White Revolution, long feared by the Russian elite, and long coveted by Western intriguers?
Russian politics has always confounded Western observers, and continues to do so. Putin is famously imperious and gets away with it. He taunted the opposition by saying he thought the original demonstrations were part of an anti-AIDS campaign, that the white ribbons were condoms. But he nonetheless sanctioned the largest political opposition rallies in the past 20 years.
US democracy-promotion NGOs such as the National Endowment for Democracy — a key player in Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution — are active in Russia’s opposition, but Putin is clearly gambling that Russians can see past US efforts to manipulate them. Besides, the winners in the Duma elections were the Communists and nationalists, with pro-Western liberals placing a distant fourth — hardly the results NEDers would have wanted.
He is also famously willing to tell US politicians they wear no clothes — the latest, last week in Siberia: “Sometimes I get the impression the US doesn’t need allies, it needs vassals.” Russian foreign policy is now firmly anti-NATO, both with respect to the West’s misguided missile system and its eagerness to turn Syria into a killing fields. Rumours that a Russian Iran-for-Syria deal with the West have proved empty. There are even hints that Iran may still get its defensive S-300 missiles from Russia in exchange for Russian access to the downed US drone. Iran claims to have four already and recently announced they have developed their own domestic version.
Pro-Putin rallies are as large as the opposition’s, with an official count of 140,000 attendees at the festive gathering Saturday. The Putinistas even bill theirs as the Anti-Orange rally. “We say no to the destruction of Russia. We say no to Orange arrogance. We say no to the American government…let’s take out the Orange trash,” political analyst Sergei Kurginyan exhorted at Moscow’s Poklonnaya Gora war memorial park. Putin thanked organisers, commenting modestly, “I share their views.”
The real reason for Putin’s return is due to the failure during his first two terms of his “sovereign democracy” to limit corruption in post-Soviet Russia. Instead, of producing a modernising authoritarianism along the lines of post-war South Korea, Putin’s rule deepened corruption — the bane of late Soviet and early post-Soviet society. Instead of trading political freedom for effective governance, he clipped Russians’ civil and political rights without delivering on this vital promise. Neither did he end collusion between the state and the oligarchs. That was the handle that badboy Alexei Navalni used to catalyse the opposition around his slogan that United Russia is the “party of swindlers and thieves”.
This was the scene in the 2000s in Ukraine, where it was possible for the NEDers to undermine the much weaker Ukrainian state and install the Western candidate Viktor Yushchenko in 2004. However, instead of addressing the problems that led to the Orange Revolution, Putin focused on foreign threats to Russian political stability rather than paying attention to domestic factors, creating patriotic youth organisations such as Nashi (Ours) and the 4 November Day of Unity holiday – the latter quickly hijacked by Russia’s nationalists.
But Russian fears of Western interference are hardly naïve. Russia was sucked into the horrendous WWI by the British empire, suffered devastating invasions in 1919 and 1941, and another half century of the West’s Cold War against it. Further dismemberment of the Russian Federation is indeed a Western goal, which would benefit no one but a tiny comprador elite, Western multinationals and the Pentagon.
Putin’s statist sovereign democracy – with transparent elections – might not be such a bad alternative to what passes for democracy in much of the West. His new Eurasian Union could help spread a more responsible political governance across the continent. It may not be what the NED has in mind, but it would be welcomed by all the “stan” citizens, not to mention China’s beleaguered Uighurs. This “EU” is striving not towards disintegration and weakness, but towards integration and mutual security, without any need for US/NATO bases and slick NED propaganda. The union will surely eventually include the mother of colour revolutions, Ukraine, where citizens still yearn for open borders with Russia and closer economic integration. The days of dreaming about the other EU’s Elysian Fields are over. The hard, cold reality today has bleached the colour revolutions, making white the appropriate colour for Russia’s version of political change.
Of course, the big problem — corruption — is what will make or break Putin’s third term as president. At the Russia 2012 Investment Forum in Moscow last week, Putin outlined plans to move Russia up to 20th spot from its current 120th in the World Bank index of investment attractiveness, by reducing bureaucracy and the associated bribery. “These measures are not enough. I believe that society must actively participate in the establishment of an anti-corruption agenda,” he vowed. Reforming the legal system and expanding the reach of democracy will be key to fighting corruption, not just via presidential decrees, but through empowering elected officials and voters. He confirmed this in his fourth major pre-election address this week by promising to provide better government services by decentralizing power from the federal level to municipalities and relying on the Internet.
So far things look good. For the first time since 1995 there will be a hotly contested transparently monitored presidential election, with the distinct possibility of a runoff (unless the new US Ambassador Michael McFaul keeps inviting NED darlings to Spaso House). The sort-of presidential debates, large-scale opposition rallies and the new independent League of Voters intending to ensure clean elections are a fine precedent, making sure that this time and in the future there will be an opportunity for genuine debate about Russia’s future.
Despite all attempts to forestall Russia’s colour revolution, it has begun — Russian-style — with no state collapse, but with a new articulate electorate, wise to both Kremlin politologists and Western NGOlogists. Its final destination is impossible for anyone to predict at this point.
Nationalist ‘ghost at feast’ in Russia
Friday, January 27th, 2012Maksim Martsinkevich, nom de guerre “Machete”, insists he is not a skinhead, even though his pate is smooth as a cue ball. The 27-year-old does not like being called a Nazi, though he once belonged to something called the National Socialist Organisation and spent four years in jail, in part for shouting “Sieg Heil!” at a political debate in 2007.
He also insists that he is not a Russian opposition leader, even though he came second in an internet vote to determine who should speak at a December 24 anti-Kremlin rally that attracted up to 100,000, the largest public demonstration since the fall of the Soviet Union.
Mr Martsinkevich was ultimately denied the stage by the organisers because of his racist views and penchant for throwing the odd “roman salute” in public. Over a cup of coffee at a Moscow Starbucks, however, he complains bitterly about the hypocrisy of it all. “I didn’t even want to speak,” Mr Martsinkevich says. “I just wanted to show that these other so-called opposition leaders are no leaders. If they can’t even win their own vote, what kind of power do they think they are going to get?”
The avowed white supremacist is the most extreme example of a perplexing issue for Russia’s anti-Kremlin protests, which began as a reaction to a December parliamentary election that is widely believed to have been rigged and has mutated into a street movement which has yet to define clear goals, aside from its ubiquitous slogan “For free elections”.
In the current turmoil, hardline nationalism is the “ghost at the feast” in the words of Alexander Verkhovsky, an expert on nationalism at Moscow’s Sova Centre think-tank. He says Russia, like much of Europe, is seeing a resurgence of the far right. “It’s natural. We had an empire, and it collapsed. All post-imperial states see a rise in nationalism. The question is not whether or not there will be a rise in nationalism, the question is what form it will take.”
While Mr Martsinkevich’s internet vote success is ascribed by opposition leaders to either a Kremlin provocation or a prank, it raises a real issue: much of the groundswell of middle class protesters is made up of liberals, standing up for universal human rights and freedoms. But much of it is not. Russian nationalists see democracy as a means to an end, a path to power, but their commitment to a pluralistic political system once they have achieved it is, at best, an open question.
One of the nationalists given the podium at the December rally, Vladimir Tor, told the crowd: “We Russian nationalists are, more than anyone else, interested in freedom and democracy in Russia, because we truly know and truly believe that in fair elections power will go to the majority”.
That many nationalist have swung into opposition against Vladimir Putin, the prime minister seeking to regain the presidency in elections this year, is troubling for the Kremlin which considered such conservatives among their core constituency. When Mr Putin came to power in 2000, he was cheered by many nationalists as a strong ruler who wanted to restore Russian pride. However, nationalists, like all independent political movements, have also felt the bite of Mr Putin’s authoritarian rule.
“The Putin regime has sent 1,500 of my brothers to prison. That is more than all the dissidents sent to prison under Brezhnev,” Mr Tor said during his speech.
Mr Putin advocates a more imperial and militaristic brand of nationalism than most Russians. He rarely has a press conference these days without hinting that dark foreign forces are at work destabilising Russia. He has championed a 19tn rouble ($614bn) spending binge re-equipping Russia’s military and called for the creation of a “Eurasian Union” of former Soviet states.
However, most ordinary Russians seem more drawn to ethnic nationalism, rather than nostalgia for great power. They are more concerned about immigration, which has increased rapidly under Mr Putin due to Russia’s economic growth; about ethnic tensions between neighbourhood gangs; and the budget-draining federal subsidies for the war-torn north Caucasus.
According to a poll by the Moscow-based Levada centre, a sociological research agency, 59 per cent of Russians “strongly” or “moderately” support the ethnic nationalist slogan “Russia for the Russians”, higher than at any time since the poll was first taken in 1998.
Nationalist Russians have deserted the Kremlin camp and swung into opposition, joining a handful of liberal activists who have latched on to the middle-class groundswell of protests.
“We [nationalists and liberals] have very different views about the future development of Russia. But we are united in seeking an end to the regime, free registration of political parties, and free elections,” Mr Tor says in an interview.
A synergy between liberals and nationalists is obvious to many in the opposition: Russia’s liberals have too many leaders and not enough followers, while nationalists have the opposite problem. Liberal ideas were discredited by the economic misery of the Yeltsin years, and the plethora of liberal parties have trouble finding recruits. Meanwhile, polls such as the Levada centre’s show broad public support for nationalist ideas but there is a lack of credible parties and popular leaders.
The most successful opposition leaders have been those who can fuse liberalism and nationalism. Alexei Navalny, the only opposition leader to beat Mr Martsinkevich in the vote for speakers at last month’s rally, is an avowed nationalist, albeit a self-styled moderate one, as well as extolling democracy and fighting corruption.
He favours curbs on immigration and argues that the war-torn Caucasus should be treated as “Russia’s Gaza Strip” and politically isolated. He also attracts controversy for addressing gatherings of extremist groups.
Mr Navalny takes offence at the suggestion that he is a racist.
“I would never consider any people ‘second class’,” he tells Boris Akunin, a liberal author, in a published email exchange.
In the Russian context, with its violent skinhead gangs, Mr Navalny is indeed a moderate, though Mr Verkhovsky likens him to far-right European politicians such as Geert Wilders and his Dutch Freedom Party.
The alliances between liberal politicians are in some cases being formalised. Liberals agreed at a meeting this month to share leadership of an umbrella group called the Civic Movement of Russia with leftist hardliners and nationalists – with all three groups given equal power on a steering committee.
Ilya Yashin, a leader of the liberal opposition Solidarity movement, makes a distinction between radical nationalists and “constitutional” ones. “I see nothing wrong with a tactical alliance with constitutional nationalists,” he says.
“I am certainly against what they say but their views certainly have a place in the political system, and they are represented in most European parliamentary democracies.”
Many democrats want to avoid seeing nationalism used to divide the opposition.
Skinheads loyal to Mr Martsinkevich tried to rush the stage at the December rally but were convinced to stand down – by other nationalists.
Some also believe that Mr Martsinkevich may be supported by the Kremlin in an effort to divide and discredit the real opposition. It is a charge he heatedly denies, citing his time in prison.
“They say I’m a Kremlin project. Where do they think I spent the last four years – in Bali?”
Related articles
- Putin slams ultra-nationalists after protests (alternet.org)
Russian billionaire placed on presidential ballot
Thursday, January 26th, 2012MOSCOW (AP) — Russian billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov has been registered as a presidential candidate and will be the only political newcomer in the race.
He joins Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and three veteran party leaders on the ballot for the March vote.
The Central Election Commission’s decision Wednesday to register Prokhorov came a day after it blocked the candidacy of an opposition leader.
Putin is seeking to return to the post he held from 2000 to 2008, and is all but certain to win.
Prokhorov’s candidacy has been seen as an effort to channel discontent among Russia‘s urban middle class, the core of the anti-Putin protest movement. Prokhorov insists he is acting independently, but he has refrained from criticizing Putin directly and has said he would consider serving as his prime minister.
Russian Ad Compares Putin Foe to Hitler
Saturday, January 14th, 2012While Republican voters in South Carolina are being warned in a new ad not to trust Mitt Romney because, “like John Kerry, he speaks French,” politicking in Russia, where a new president will be elected in March, is a good deal less subtle.
The ad, which matches some of Mr. Navalny’s gestures and words at protests in December to archival footage of Hitler, was posted on a Russian blogdevoted to mocking Mr. Putin’s opponents. It was accompanied by a headline warning that a revered Bulgarian mystic once said that Hitler would return in the 21st century, and text that implored viewers to “not allow this prediction to come true!”
Although the video was uploaded to YouTube on Wednesday, it attracted relatively few viewers until Mr. Navalny himself drew attention to it on his Twitter feed the next day. In the following 24 hours, it was viewed nearly 100,000 times.
The attempt to caricature Mr. Navalny as a fascist, based on his embrace of Russian nationalism, also inspired a series of cartoons posted on a pro-Putin tabloid news site, Lifenews.ru. Last month, after the blogger electrified the first protest rally in Moscow, the tabloid’s cartoons imagined Mr. Navalny spending his day barking “sieg heil,” while raising his arm in a Nazi salute even as he carries out the most mundane chores.
The resort to cartoons to attack a blogger who cites “The Simpsons” and “South Park” in interviews appears to be part of a wide-ranging campaign by supporters of the status quo to tarnish his image with Russians who trust the Internet more than state-controlled television.
As our colleague Andrew Kramer reported this week, one part of that effort was the publication of a digitally altered photograph that placed a laughing Mr. Navlany beside an exiled oligarch. The blogger’s fans responded by exposing, then mocking, the fake by creating even more preposterous fakesthat pictured him standing with a series of figures, including Stalin, Napoleon, Hitler and a space alien.
In a New Yorker profile of the blogger last year, Julia Ioffe wrote that Mr. Navalny’s embrace of Russian nationalism has baffled and repulsed the liberal opposition to Mr. Putin, which fears a movement that includes neo-Nazis in its ranks. In 2007, Ms. Ioffe noted, when Mr. Navalny was kicked out of a liberal opposition party the group cited his nationalist views as the reason.
He had been photographed attending planning meetings for the Russian March, a hardline nationalist march that has coursed through Moscow, sometimes violently, every November since 2005, chanting such slogans as “Russia for Russians!” Liberal parties had reacted to the Russian March with horror, branding it a neo-Nazi parade. Navalny argued that the event attracted more “normal” participants than “sieg heilers,” and that liberals were making themselves irrelevant by failing to address an upswell of nationalism in a constructive way….
Part of Navalny’s appeal is his rejection of Russian liberalism, which he sees as being hopelessly out of touch with a country that is fundamentally conservative. His nationalism is unapologetic and even shocking. In a series of humorous videos on YouTube, he can be seen advocating the repatriation of illegals (while footage scrolls of people of Asian appearance moving swiftly through an airport) and the use of pistols against lawless undesirables.
Mr. Navalny told Ms. Ioffe that he wanted to discuss issues like illegal immigration because, “When we make these questions taboo and don’t discuss them, we hand over this extremely important agenda to the radicals.” But even if he has nuanced positions on controversial issues, he certainly left himself open to caricature by starring in Internet videos in which hecompares migrants with rotten teeth that need to be removed, and argues that just as fly swatters are used against insects, guns should be available for useagainst lawbreakers (like Islamist militants).
More recently, Mr. Navalny denied that he holds any racist views in an interview with Grigory Chkhartishvili, a writer who asked him what his vision of Russian nationalism means.
At the start of the interview, Mr. Chkhartishvili’s asked, “Should ethnic non-Russians and half-Russians feel like second class human beings in your Russia?” Mr. Navalny replied: “There’s no such thing as a second class human being, and anyone who thinks there is, is a dangerous lunatic who should be re-educated, treated or isolated from human society. As a matter of principle there can be no question of discrimination against people on ethnic grounds.”
After Mr. Navalny added that he stood by a nationalist manifesto that he signed some time ago, Mr. Chkhartishvili said he agreed with that manifesto’s main thesis, which was, “Our country’s unity, power and prosperity will only be enhanced if we can ensure equality before the law for all its citizens, whatever their ethnic origins, social status and place of residence.”
















